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In spatial games players typically alter their strategy by imitating the most successful or
one randomly selected neighbor. Since when a single neighbor is taken as reference, the
information stemming from other neighbors is neglected, which begets the consideration of
alternative, possibly more realistic approaches. Here we show that strategy changes inspired
not only by the performance of individual neighbors but rather by entire neighborhoods
introduce a qualitatively different evolutionary dynamics that is able to support the stable
existence of very small cooperative clusters. This leads to phase diagrams that differ sig-
nificantly from those obtained by means of pairwise strategy updating. In particular, the
survivability of cooperators is possible even by high temptations to defect and over a much
wider uncertainty range. We support the simulation results by means of pair approximations
and analysis of spatial patterns, which jointly highlight the importance of local information
for the resolution of social dilemmas.
∗Electronic address: matjaz.perc@uni-mb.si
Cooperative behavior is extremely important, both in the animal world as well as across human
societies [1–4]. Yet cooperation is also an evolutionary puzzle, as it is costly to the actors though
beneficial to the commons. How cooperation evolved amongst selfish and unrelated individuals is
therefore still ardently investigated, as evidenced by recent reviews [5–10].
Evolutionary game theory [11–13] provides an apt theoretical framework to address the sub-
tleties of the evolution of cooperation. One of the most popular games that is representative for
situations constituting a social dilemma is the prisoner’s dilemma game [1]. It can be summarized
succinctly. Two individuals have to decide simultaneously whether they wish to cooperate or not.
Cooperator pays a cost c towards the mutual benefit b where b > c > 0, while defector contributes
nothing. This yields the temptation to defect T = b, reward for mutual cooperation R = b − c,
punishment for mutual defection P = 0, and the sucker’s payoff S = −c, which for the prisoner’s
dilemma game thus satisfy T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S. Evidently, for an individual it
is best to defect regardless of what the opponent does. As rational players are aware of this, they
both defect, in turn obtaining P rather than R, hence the social dilemma [14].
Several mechanisms that facilitate the evolution of cooperation are known. Nowak summarizes
five rules [6], which are kin selection [15], direct reciprocity [16], indirect reciprocity [17], group
selection [18], and network reciprocity [19]. Networks in particular, have received substantial at-
tention in the recent past [7]. While scale-free networks appear to provide the best environment for
the evolution of cooperation [20–27], small-world [28–32] and hierarchical networks [33–35] also
received ample attention. Largely motivated by the discovery that complex networks facilitate the
evolution of cooperation, heterogeneity in general has emerged as an important property that may
help keep defectors in the minority [36–39]. Coevolutionary games [10], where the structure of
the network was subject to evolution just as the strategies of players have been studied thoroughly
too [40–54], with the prevailing conclusion being that this may give rise to robust cooperative
states and lead to socially preferable interaction networks in a spontaneous manner. Quite remark-
ably, this has recently been confirmed empirically [55], although very extensive experiments also
indicate that the human behavior may suppress network reciprocity [56, 57].
In fact, how human decision-making affects the evolution of cooperation is of particular rele-
vance for the present work. Szabo´ et al. [58] have recently considered a special type of strategy
updating. Instead of players exclusively caring only about their own payoffs when updating their
strategies, they investigated what happens when a pair of randomly chosen neighboring players
tries to maximize their collective income by simultaneously updating their two strategies. It was
reported that the proposed strategy update rule produces the antiferromagnetic ordering structure
of cooperators and defectors on the square lattice at sufficiently low noise intensities, and that this
favors the evolution of cooperation more than the traditional pairwise imitation updating. Human
decision-making dynamics has also been investigated experimentally, whereby we are particularly
interested in the so called “social influence” effect reported by Lorenz et al. [59]. As stated in
their paper, social influence among group members plays an important role in individual decision-
making.
One may then ask how this affects the evolution of cooperation. To address this question, we
propose an adaptive strategy-adoption rule in which the social influence is taken into account.
In particular, as a proxy for the social influence we assume that the decisions the players make
are affected by all their neighbors, not just a single randomly selected or the most successful
neighbor. Players can collect information from their neighbors, and moreover, their decision-
making is more likely to be affected by the circle of “close friends” rather than the whole social
environment. Generally, the performance of a strategy can be measured by comparing the average
payoff of the players who adopt this strategy with that of the players who adopt the other strategy,
if any, in the neighborhood. Players are more likely to adopt the strategy with better performance
within their neighborhoods for the purpose of maximizing their own payoffs. Based on the above
considerations, we introduce the so-called local influence to the strategy updating simply that,
before a potential update, each player considers the performance of its own strategy and that of the
other strategy, if present, within its neighborhood. As we will show in what follows, this introduces
a qualitatively different evolutionary dynamics that is able to support the stable existence of very
small cooperative clusters, which in turn supports the survivability of cooperative behavior even
under very unfavorable conditions. Besides simulation results [60], we will also present results
obtained with pair approximation methods, which are, along with the game theoretical model,
accurately described in the Methods section.
Results
We begin by presenting the fraction of cooperators ρC as a function of the cost-to-benefit ratio
r = c/b at two temperatures, namely at K = 0.1 and K = 0.83. Note that the usage of the latter
value is motivated by recent empirical research from behavioral science [61]. Results for both the
pairwise and locally influenced strategy updating are presented in Fig. 1(a,c). It can be observed
that for K = 0.1 the evolution of cooperation is promoted across the whole applicable span of r if
the traditionally used pairwise strategy updating is replaced by the proposed local influence based
strategy updating. For K = 0.83, however, the outcome is a bit less clear-cut. While pairwise
imitation fails to sustain cooperative behavior at such high values of r as locally influenced strategy
updating, it is nevertheless more apt for achieving complete cooperator dominance. As we will
show in what follows, it is indeed the case that locally influenced strategy updating often fails to
completely eliminate defectors at small values of r, yet it opens up the possibility of survival of
cooperators even under harsh defector-friendly conditions.
These simulation results can be corroborated by results of pair approximations (see Methods
for details), which we present in Fig. 1(b,d). The general trends are predicted correctly, although
as expect, the beneficial effect of network reciprocity [19] at low values of r are underestimated. It
is worth mentioning that the pair approximation is in general more accurate for larger values of K
[62]. This is due to the fact that the pair approximation method does not consider the long-range
correlations. Then the bigger clusters existing in the case of low K can not be properly described
by pair approximation. This explains why the pair approximation method poorly predicts the sim-
ulation results for low K. Indeed, it can be observed that the agreement with simulation results is
better for K = 0.83 than it is for K = 0.1. In particular, for K = 0.83 the pair approximation
method correctly predicts the occurrence of an intersection point [compare panels (c) and (d)].
Altogether, results of pair approximations corroborate the conclusion that the survivability of co-
operators, especially at high values of r, is substantially promoted by locally influenced strategy
updating.
Further adding to the robustness of this conclusion are results presented in Fig. 2(a,c), where we
present full K − r phase diagrams for both considered updating rules. It can be observed that the
positive impact of local influence on the evolution of cooperation persists across large regions of
K. On the other hand, the presented phase diagrams also evidence more clearly the failure of the
proposed updating rule to lead to an absorbing C phase. Moreover, there is a notable qualitative
difference in the critical behavior that is evoked by the updating rule. By focusing on theD → C+
D phase boundaries, it can be observed that for pairwise strategy updating there exists an optimal
value of K at which cooperators thrive best. Note that the D → C + D phase boundary is bell-
shaped, indicating thatK ≈ 0.3 is the optimal temperature at which cooperators are able to survive
at the highest value of r. For strategy updating based on local influence, however, this feature is
absent. The D → C + D phase boundary is in fact an inverted bell, indicating the existence of
the worst rather than an optimal value of K. It is worth emphasizing that previous studies found
that it is the lack of overlapping triangles, as is the case for the square lattice as well as for random
regular graphs, that introduces the optimal uncertainty K for the evolution of cooperation for
pairwise strategy updating [62–64]. The results obtained by considering local influence therefore
suggest that the system is behaving as if overlapping triangles were in fact present in the interaction
network. Note that in the latter case an optimal K for the evolution of cooperation does not exist.
This leads us to the conclusion that the interaction network is effectively altered when the local
influence is taken into account. In particular, triplets of players that are not connected by means of
the original interaction graph (the square lattice) become effectively connected through the joint
participation of players in the same local groups (neighborhoods) that are subject to the same local
influence. An identical effect was indeed observed by the study of the public goods game [65],
where triplets also became effectively connected because of the participation of players in the
same groups. Below, we will provide further evidence concerning the effective linkage of triples
of players, which is essentially a side effect of locally influenced strategy updating. Another
interesting observation is that the parameter region of the mixedC+D phase in general widens as
K increases, which is in contract to the results obtained by means of pairwise strategy updating.
We have also constructed full K − r phase diagrams by means of pair approximations. Fig-
ure 2(b,d) features the obtained results, from which it follows that qualitative features, compared
to the simulation results, are again captured fairly accurately, although the extent of the parameter
region of the mixed C +D phase is overestimated. Expectedly, the predictions are also less accu-
rate near the phase boundaries, which is because the pair approximation does not take into account
loops nor does it take into account long-range correlations, which however, have a noticeable effect
especially in the vicinity of critical transitions [66].
In order to obtain an understanding of the reported observations, we proceed with the presenta-
tion of characteristic spatial patterns, as obtained for both pairwise and locally influenced strategy
updating rules, in Fig. 3. Regardless of which update rule is applied, cooperators form compact
clusters by means of which they are able to exploit the mechanism of network reciprocity [19].
If the value of r is small, the clusters are larger and more compact than for higher values of r.
On the other hand, the spatial patterns emerging under the two update rules also have noticeable
dissimilarities. Foremost, given a value of r, pairwise strategy updating yields larger clusters than
locally influenced strategy updating, even if the density of cooperators is approximately the same
[compare panels (a) and (c)]. Nearer to the extinction threshold the stationary densities differ,
yet the difference in the spatial patterns the two rules generate becomes most apparent [compare
panels (b) and (d)].
The visual inspection of the characteristic spatial patterns invites a quantitative analysis of the
exposed differences, the results of which are presented in Fig. 4 separately for both updating rules.
It can be observed that, in general, as r increases, the cluster size decreases. The number of clus-
ters, on the other hand, is maximal at an intermediate value of r. Concrete r values, however,
differ significantly for the two considered strategy updating rules. In particular, by pairwise strat-
egy updating both the clusters size and the number of clusters are shifted significantly towards
lower values of r. One reason is obviously that pairwise strategy updating simply does not sup-
port the survivability of cooperators by as high values of r as locally influenced strategy updating.
Nonetheless, the fact that for any given value of r, where comparisons are possible, the typical
cluster size obtained with pairwise strategy updating is much larger than the one obtained with
locally influenced strategy updating begets the conclusion that there are significant differences in
the way cooperators cluster to withstand being wiped out by defectors. Note that for cooperators
to survive under pairwise updating the minimally required cluster size is ≈ 76.18, while for lo-
cally influenced updating it is only 6.61. Moreover, for pairwise strategy updating the cluster size
decreases much faster, which speaks in favor of the increased stability of the clusters under locally
influenced strategy updating.
To confirm these conjectures, we present in Fig. 5 two typical C-cluster configurations and
analyze the survivability of cooperators separately for each particular case. For the sake of sim-
plicity but without loss of generality, we consider for the following analysis only the K → 0 limit.
Then if the payoff of each cooperator along the boundary is larger than that of each defector in its
neighborhood, we are allowed to conclude that such aC-cluster will survive. For the left C-cluster
pattern in Fig. 5 under pairwise updating, the payoffs of a cooperator C (PC) and defector D (PD)
along the boundary are
PC = 2 and PD = 1 + 4r, (1)
respectively. For locally influenced updating, however, the average payoff of cooperators (P¯C) and
the average payoff of defectors (P¯D) along the boundary are given by
P¯C = 2 and P¯D = 1 + 4r, (2)
respectively. Thus for such a C-cluster pattern to survive, both update rules lead to r < −0.25.
Indeed, neither locally influenced nor pairwise strategy updating support the survivability of such
a pattern. Performing the same analysis for the configuration on the right, however, yields a
different outcome. The payoff of a cooperator C2 (PC2) on the boundary and that of the two types
of defectors D1 and D2 (PD2 and PD1) are
PC2 = 1, PD1 = 2 + 4r andPD2 = 1 + 4r, (3)
respectively. For locally influenced updating the corresponding payoffs are
P¯C =
5
2
and P¯D =
5
3
+ 4r. (4)
Accordingly, we find that under pairwise updating the condition for survivability is r < −0.25,
while under locally influenced updating it is only r < 5
24
. Hence, locally influenced strategy
updating can warrant the survivability of cooperators when grouped in this way, while pairwise
updating can not. Note also that the C-cluster configuration on the right of Fig. 5 is the smallest
one which can persist in the population under the most hostile conditions under locally influenced
strategy updating. Based on this analysis, we can in fact estimate the extinction threshold r =
5
24
≈ 0.21 in the limit K → 0, and indeed we find excellent agreement between this analytical
approximation and the simulation results presented in Fig. 2(c).
With these insights, we argue that local influence based strategy updating can support the sur-
vivability only if the core of theC-cluster is isolated from defectors (compare left and right config-
uration of Fig. 5), because cooperators along the boundary can then gain a higher level of support
from the cluster and thus protect themselves against being exploited by defectors. In previous
works, where only pairwise strategy updating was considered, individual players were concerned
only with their own payoffs when updating their strategies. However, if individuals are exposed
to the local influence, i.e., they care about the performances of the strategies in their neighbor-
hood, cooperators can benefit not only from their own payoffs, but also from the payoffs of their
cooperative neighbors. In this sense, locally influenced strategy updating further strengthens the
linkage between cooperators within cooperative clusters, and so cooperators can reciprocate with
each other on a profounder and altogether more effective level.
Furthermore, we also investigate the effects of other typical topologies, i.e., the regular small-
world graph [67] and the scale-free network [68], for both pairwise and locally influenced strategy
updating rules. It is found that cooperation can also be promoted in the regular small-world graphs
with different rewiring probabilities. While for the scale-free networks, we find that cooperation
can be favored if individuals’ payoffs are normalized by the numbers of their neighbors. Hence we
can conclude that the promotion of cooperation by the locally influenced strategy updating rule is
overall robust to the variations of the underlying interaction networks.
Discussion
Summarizing, we have analyzed the impact of “local influence” on the evolution of cooperation
in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Instead of the performance of a single neighbor, players
considered the performances of the two strategies within their neighborhoods. We have shown that
by going beyond the traditionally assumed pairwise strategy updating, the evolution of cooperation
can be promoted. We have determined full K − r phase diagrams by means of simulations and
pair approximation methods, which both indicate that this effect is robust against uncertainty by
strategy adoptions. Moreover, the phase separation lines indicate that the consideration of local in-
fluence effectively changes the interaction network as an optimal K is no longer inferable. This is
characteristic for interaction networks with overlapping triangles [62, 64], which are obviously not
part of the square lattice topology that we have employed. By analyzing the macroscopic features
of emerging spatial patterns as well as the survivability of typical cooperative clusters, we have
provided further insights as to how the consideration of local influence changes the evolutionary
dynamics. Finally, we have further found that the beneficial effect of locally influenced strategy
updating rule is, in general, robust to the variations of the underlying interaction networks.
Lastly, it is worth relating the presently considered strategy updating rule to previous game-
theoretical models. By the win-stay-lose-shift rule [32, 69–72], for example, each individual has
an aspiration according to which it judges whether or not to change strategy. The aspiration,
however, is traditionally assumed to be constant. In our case, on the other hand, we relax this
assumption by considering the aspiration as a dynamical quantity. Note that the average payoff of
the strategy that is not adopted by the focal player can in fact be regarded as the aspiration level.
This in turn implies that here the aspiration depends on the outcome of the game, and hence is
subject to change. Moreover, the present rule can be regarded as a learning rule. The difference
from the traditional single role model learning rule is that in the present case the strategy update
depends not on the comparison of a pair of individuals, but on the comparison of two groups of
individuals, each involving several individuals adopting the same strategy. Overall, we hope that
these considerations, and in particular the consideration of local influence, will motivate further
research aimed at promoting our understanding of the evolution of cooperation.
Methods
Mathematical model
Players are located on the vertices of a L × L square lattice with periodic boundary condi-
tions. Each individual is initially designated either as a cooperator C or defector D with equal
probability. For the pairwise imitation strategy updating rule [73] (we use the label “pairwise” in
the figure legends when applying this rule), Monte Carlo simulations of the game are carried out
comprising the following elementary steps. First, a randomly selected player x collects its payoff
Px by interacting with its four nearest neighbors. For the purpose of payoff evaluation, it is worth
introducing unit vectors S = [1, 0]T and [0, 1]T for cooperators and defectors, respectively. The
payoff matrix is
M =
⎡
⎢⎣
1 0
1 + r r
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
where r ∈ (0, 1) is the cost-to-benefit ratio. The payoff of player x is thus
Px =
∑
z∈Γ(x)
STx MSz ,
where Γ(x) represents its neighborhood. Then one randomly chosen neighbor y of player x also
acquires its payoff Py identically as previously player x.
After the evaluation of their payoffs, player x considers changing its strategy. Player x adopts
the strategy Sy of player y with the probability
T (Py − Px) =
1
1 + exp[(Px − Py)/K]
, (5)
where K is the uncertainty by strategy adoptions.
If the local influence is taken into account (we use the label “local” in the figure legends when
applying this rule), however, the elementary steps are as follows. First, we randomly choose a
player x with the strategy Sx. Next, we evaluate the average payoff P¯Sx of those players who
adopt the same strategy Sx, as well as the average payoff P¯S¯x of those players who adopt the
opposite strategy S¯x of player x, if any, within the neighborhood. In particular, we have
P¯Sx =
∑
z∈Γ(x)
Pzδ(S¯
T
x Sz) + Px
∑
z∈Γ(x)
δ(S¯Tx Sz) + 1
and P¯S¯x =
∑
z∈Γ(x)
Pzδ(S
T
x Sz)
∑
z∈Γ(x)
δ(STx Sz)
,
where the Dirac delta function δ(x) satisfies
δ(x) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0, ifx = 0
1, ifx = 0
.
Lastly, player x will adopt the strategy S¯x with the probability
T (P¯S¯x − P¯Sx) =
1
1 + exp[−(P¯S¯x − P¯Sx)/K]
, (6)
where K is, as by pairwise imitation, the uncertainty by strategy adoptions.
The presented simulation results were obtained by usingL = 100−400 depending on the prox-
imity to phase separation lines and the size of the emerging spatial patterns. In accordance with
the random sequential update, each Monte Carlo step, which consists of repeating the elementary
steps L × L times corresponding to all players, gives a chance once on average for every player
to alter its strategy. The stationary frequency of cooperators ρC is determined by averaging over
104 Monte Carlo steps in the stationary state after sufficiently long relaxation times. In general,
the stationary state has been considered to be reached when the average of the cooperation level
becomes time-independent. In our simulations, the relaxation time is 4 × 104 Monte Carlo steps.
We confirm that this relaxation time is long enough for the system to evolve into the stationary
state. To further increase the accuracy of our simulations, we have averaged the final outcome over
at least 50 independent initial conditions.
Pair approximations
Let pC and pD = 1− pC denote the frequencies of cooperators and defectors, respectively, and
let pCC , pCD, pDC and pDD represent the frequencies ofCC, CD, DC andDD pairs, respectively.
Then qX|Y = pXY /pY with X, Y ∈ C,D specifies the conditional probability to find an X-player
given that the neighboring node is occupied by an Y -player. Note that here X , Y and Z denote
either C or D. Instead of the first-order approximation considering the frequency of strategies as
in the well-mixed population, the pair approximation tracks the frequencies of strategy pairs pXY
(X, Y ∈ C,D). The probabilities of larger configurations are approximated by the frequencies of
configurations not more complex than pairs. Based on the compatibility condition pX =
∑
Y pXY ,
the symmetry condition pXY = pY X , and closure conditions, pC and pCC can fully determine the
dynamics of the system. While the pair approximation for pairwise imitation is well-known and
can be looked up for example in the Appendix of [7] or more recently [74], for the imitation based
on local influence the derivations are as follows.
A defector is selected for strategy updating with the probability pD. Let kC and kD denote the
number of cooperators and defectors amongst the neighbors on a regular lattice with degree k,
respectively. The frequency of such a configuration is
k!
kC !kD!
qkCC|Dq
kD
D|D,
and the payoff of the defector is PD(kC , kD) = (1+ r) · kC + r · kD. The configuration probability
with which a neighboring cooperator has k ′C cooperators and k
′
D defectors as its neighbors is
(k − 1)!
k
′
C !k
′
D!
q
k
′
C
C|CDq
k
′
D
D|CD,
where qX|Y Z gives the conditional probability that a player next to the Y Z pair is in state X . The
payoff of the neighboring cooperator is PC(k
′
C , k
′
D) = k
′
C . Similarly, the configuration probability
with which a neighboring defector has k ′C cooperators and k
′
D defectors as its neighbors is
(k − 1)!
k
′
C!k
′
D!
q
k
′
C
C|DDq
k
′
D
D|DD,
and the payoff of the neighboring defector is PD(k
′
C , k
′
D) = (1 + r) · k
′
C + r · (k
′
D + 1). Thus, the
average payoff P¯C of cooperators that are neighbors of the focal defector is
P¯C =
k−1∑
k
′
C
=0
(k−1)!
k
′
C
!k
′
D
!
q
k
′
C
C|CDq
k
′
D
D|CD·PC(k
′
C , k
′
D)
= (k − 1) · qC|CD.
(7)
The average payoff P¯D of defectors that are neighbors of the focal defector, on the other hand, is
P¯D =
kD·
k−1∑
k
′
C
=0
(k−1)!
k
′
C
!k
′
D
!
q
k
′
C
C|DD
q
k
′
D
D|DD
·PD(k
′
C
,k
′
D
)+PD(kC ,kD)
kD+1
=
kD ·[(k−1)·qC|DD+rk]+rk+kC
kD+1
.
(8)
Consequently, pC increases by 1/N where N = L2, with probability
Pr ob(∆pC =
1
N
) = pD ·
k∑
kC=1
k!
kC !kD!
qkCC|Dq
kD
D|D · T (P¯C − P¯D), (9)
where T (P¯C − P¯D) is the individual transition probability given by Eq. (6). The number of CC
pairs increases by kC , and thus pCC increases by 2kC/(kN) with probability
Pr ob(∆pCC =
2kC
kN
) = pD ·
k!
kC !kD!
qkCC|Dq
kD
D|D · T (P¯C − P¯D). (10)
A cooperator, on the other hand, is selected for strategy updating with the probability pC . The
frequency of a configuration that there are kC cooperators and kD defectors in the neighborhood
of the focal cooperator is
k!
kC !kD!
qkCC|Cq
kD
D|C ,
and the payoff of the focal cooperator is PC(kC , kD) = kC . The configuration probability with
which a neighboring cooperator has k′C cooperators and k
′
D defectors as its neighbors is
(k − 1)!
k
′
C !k
′
D!
q
k
′
C
C|CCq
k
′
D
D|CC ,
and the payoff of the neighboring cooperator is PC(k
′
C , k
′
D) = k
′
C +1. Similarly, the configuration
probability with which a neighboring defector has k ′C cooperators and k
′
D defectors as its neighbors
is
(k − 1)!
k
′
C !k
′
D!
q
k
′
C
C|DCq
k
′
D
D|DC ,
and the payoff of the neighboring defector is PD(k
′
C , k
′
D) = (1 + r) · (k
′
C + 1) + rk
′
D. Thus the
average payoff P¯C of cooperators in the neighborhood of the focal cooperator is
P¯C =
kC ·
k−1∑
k
′
C
=0
(k−1)!
k
′
C
!k
′
D
!
q
k
′
C
C|CC
q
k
′
D
D|CC
·PC(k
′
C
,k
′
D
)+PC(kC ,kD)
kC+1
=
kC ·[(k−1)·qC|CC+2]
kC+1
,
(11)
while, the average payoff P¯D of defectors in the neighborhood of the focal cooperator is
P¯D =
k−1∑
k
′
C
=0
(k−1)!
k
′
C
!k
′
D
!
q
k
′
C
C|DCq
k
′
D
D|DC ·PD(k
′
C, k
′
D)
= (k − 1) · qC|DC + 1 + rk.
(12)
Thus pC decreases by 1/N with probability
Pr ob(∆pC = −
1
N
) = pC ·
k−1∑
kC=0
k!
kC !kD!
qkCC|Cq
kD
D|C · T (P¯D − P¯C). (13)
Moreover, the number of CC pairs decreases by kC and thus pCC decreases by 2kC/(kN) with
probability
Pr ob(∆pCC = −
2kC
kN
) = pC ·
k!
kC !kD!
qkCC|Cq
kD
D|C · T (P¯D − P¯C). (14)
These derivations lead us to the master equations
p˙C = Pr ob(∆pC =
1
N
)− Pr ob(∆pC = −
1
N
) (15)
and
p˙CC =
k∑
kC=0
2kC
k
[Pr ob(∆pCC =
2kC
kN
)− Pr ob(∆pCC = −
2kC
kN
)]. (16)
Although these equations are per derivation exact, they do depend on the density of triplet con-
figurations which are outside their scope. Thus, in order to “close” the system of differential
equations, the triplet configuration probabilities have to be approximated by probabilities of con-
figurations that are not more complex than pairs. Note that by using different closure conditions,
we can in general obtain different pair approximations. Here we employ the so-called ordinary
pair approximation method, where only the first-order pair correlations are considered. We thus
have qX|Y Z ≈ qX|Y .
[1] Axelrod, R. The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, New York, 1984).
[2] Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution (Princeton
Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, 2011).
[3] Hrdy, S. B. Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual Understanding (Harvard Univ.
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2011).
[4] Nowak, M. A. & Highfield, R. SuperCooperators: Altruism, Evolution, and Why We Need Each Other
to Succeed (Free Press, New York, 2011).
[5] Doebeli, M. & Hauert, C. Models of cooperation based on Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift game.
Ecol. Lett. 8, 748–766 (2005).
[6] Nowak, M. A. Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation. Science 314, 1560–1563 (2006).
[7] Szabo´, G. & Fa´th, G. Evolutionary games on graphs. Phys. Rep. 446, 97–216 (2007).
[8] Schuster, S., Kreft, J.-U., Schroeter, A. & Pfeiffer, T. Use of Game-Theoretical Methods in Biochem-
istry and Biophysics. J. Biol. Phys. 34, 1–17 (2008).
[9] Roca, C. P., Cuesta, J. A. & Sa´nchez, A. Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects
beyond replicator dynamics. Phys. Life Rev. 6, 208–249 (2009).
[10] Perc, M. & Szolnoki, A. Coevolutionary games – a mini review. BioSystems 99, 109–125 (2010).
[11] Hofbauer, J. & Sigmund, K. Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics (Cambridge Univ. Press,
Cambridge, UK, 1998).
[12] Nowak, M. A. Evolutionary Dynamics (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006).
[13] Sigmund, K. The Calculus of Selfishness (Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, MA, 2010).
[14] Glance, N. S. & Huberman, B. A. The Dynamics of Social Dilemmas. Scientific American 76–81
(1994).
[15] Hamilton, W. D. Genetical evolution of social behavior II. J. Theor. Biol. 7, 17–52 (1964).
[16] Trivers, R. L. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q. Rev. Biol. 46, 35–57 (1971).
[17] Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring. Nature 393, 573–
577 (1998).
[18] Wilson, D. S. A Theory of Group Selection. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA 72, 143–146 (1975).
[19] Nowak, M. A. & May, R. M. Evolutionary Games and Spatial Chaos. Nature 359, 826–829 (1992).
[20] Santos, F. C. & Pacheco, J. M. Scale-free networks provide a unifying framework for the emergence
of cooperation. Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 098104 (2005).
[21] Santos, F. C., Pacheco, J. M. & Lenaerts, T. Evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in structured
heterogeneous populations. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 103, 3490–3494 (2006).
[22] Santos, F. C., Rodrigues, J. F. & Pacheco, J. M. Graph topology plays a determinant role in the
evolution of cooperation. Proc. R. Soc. B 273, 51–55 (2006).
[23] Go´mez-Garden˜es, J., Campillo, M., Moreno, Y. & Florı´a, L. M. Dynamical Organization of Cooper-
ation in Complex Networks. Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 108103 (2007).
[24] Poncela, J., Go´mez-Garden˜es, J., Florı´a, L. M. & Moreno, Y. Robustness of cooperation in the evolu-
tionary prisoner’s dilemma on complex systems. New J. Phys. 9, 184 (2007).
[25] Szolnoki, A., Perc, M. & Danku, Z. Towards effective payoffs in the prisoner’s dilemma game on
scale-free networks. Physica A 387, 2075–2082 (2008).
[26] Poncela, J., Go´mez-Garden˜es, J., Florı´a, L. M., Moreno, Y. & Sa´nchez, A. Cooperative scale-free
networks despite the presence of defector hubs. EPL 88, 38003 (2009).
[27] Perc, M. Evolution of cooperation on scale-free networks subject to error and attack. New J. Phys. 11,
033027 (2009).
[28] Santos, F. C., Rodrigues, J. F. & Pacheco, J. M. Epidemic spreading and cooperation dynamics on
homogeneous small-world networks. Phys. Rev. E 72, 056128 (2005).
[29] Ren, J., Wang, W.-X. & Qi, F. Randomness enhances cooperation: coherence resonance in evolution-
ary game. Phys. Rev. E 75, 045101(R) (2007).
[30] Fu, F., Liu, L.-H. & Wang, L. Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma on heterogeneous Newman-Watts
small-world network. Eur. Phys. J. B 56, 367–372 (2007).
[31] Perc, M. Double resonance in cooperation induced by noise and network variation for an evolutionary
prisoner’s dilemma. New J. Phys. 8, 183 (2006).
[32] Chen, X.-J. & Wang, L. Promotion of cooperation induced by appropriate payoff aspirations in a
small-world networked game. Phys. Rev. E 77, 017103 (2008).
[33] Vukov, J. & Szabo´, G. Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on hierarchical lattices. Phys. Rev. E
71, 036133 (2005).
[34] Go´mez-Garden˜es, J., Poncela, J., Florı´a, L. M. & Moreno, Y. Natural Selection of Cooperation and
Degree Hierarchy in Heterogeneous Populations. J. Theor. Biol. 253, 296–301 (2008).
[35] Lee, S., Holme, P. & Wu, Z.-X. Emergent Hierarchical Structures in Multiadaptive Games. Phys. Rev.
Lett. 106, 028702 (2011).
[36] Santos, F. C., Santos, M. D. & Pacheco, J. M. Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation
in public goods games. Nature 454, 213–216 (2008).
[37] Perc, M. & Szolnoki, A. Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s
dilemma game. Phys. Rev. E 77, 011904 (2008).
[38] Perc, M. Does strong heterogeneity promote cooperation by group interactions? New J. Phys. 13,
123027 (2007).
[39] Santos, F. C., Pinheiro, F., Lenaerts, T. & Pacheco, J. M. Role of diversity in the evolution of cooper-
ation. J. Theor. Biol. 299, 88–96 (2012).
[40] Zimmermann, M. G., Eguı´luz, V. & Miguel, M. S. Coevolution of dynamical states and interactions
in dynamic networks. Phys. Rev. E 69, 065102(R) (2004).
[41] Zimmermann, M. G. & Eguı´luz, V. Cooperation, Social Networks and the Emergence of Leadership
in a Prisoner’s Dilemma with Local Interactions. Phys. Rev. E 72, 056118 (2005).
[42] Pacheco, J. M., Traulsen, A. & Nowak, M. A. Active linking in evolutionary games. J. Theor. Biol.
243, 437–443 (2006).
[43] Pacheco, J. M., Traulsen, A. & Nowak, M. A. Coevolution of strategy and structure in complex
networks with dynamical linking. Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 258103 (2006).
[44] Santos, F. C., Pacheco, J. M. & Lenaerts, T. Cooperation prevails when individuals adjust their social
ties. PLoS Comput. Biol. 2, 1284–1290 (2006).
[45] Fu, F., Hauert, C., Nowak, M. A. & Wang, L. Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation
in social networks. Phys. Rev. E 78, 026117 (2008).
[46] Fu, F., Wu, T. & Wang, L. Partner switching stabilizes cooperation in coevolutionary Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Phys. Rev. E 79, 036101 (2009).
[47] Chen, X., Fu, F. & Wang, L. Social tolerance allows cooperation to prevail in an adaptive environment.
Phys. Rev. E 80, 051104 (2009).
[48] Wu, T., Fu, F. & Wang, L. Individual’s expulsion to nasty environment promotes cooperation in public
goods games. EPL 88, 30011 (2009).
[49] Szolnoki, A., Perc, M. & Danku, Z. Making new connections towards cooperation in the prisoner’s
dilemma game. EPL 84, 50007 (2008).
[50] Poncela, J., Go´mez-Garden˜es, J., Florı´a, L. M., Sa´nchez, A. & Moreno, Y. Complex cooperative
networks from evolutionary preferential attachment. PLoS ONE 3, e2449 (2008).
[51] Poncela, J., Go´mez-Garden˜es, J., Traulsen, A. & Moreno, Y. Evolutionary game dynamics in a grow-
ing structured population. New J. Phys. 11, 083031 (2009).
[52] Szolnoki, A. & Perc, M. Resolving social dilemmas on evolving random networks. EPL 86, 30007
(2009).
[53] Szolnoki, A. & Perc, M. Emergence of multilevel selection in the prisoner’s dilemma game on coe-
volving random networks. New J. Phys. 11, 093033 (2009).
[54] Zhang, C., Zhang, J., Xie, G., Wang, L. & Perc, M. Evolution of Interactions and Cooperation in the
Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. PLoS ONE 6, e26724 (2011).
[55] Rand, D. G., Arbesman, S. & Christakis, N. A. Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in
experiments with humans. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108, 19193–19198 (2011).
[56] Gracia-La´zaro, C., Cuesta, J., Sa´nchez, A. & Moreno, Y. Human behavior in Prisoner’s Dilemma
experiments suppresses network reciprocity. Sci. Rep. 2, 325 (2012).
[57] Gracia-La´zaro, C. et al. Heterogeneous networks do not promote cooperation when humans play a
prisoner’s dilemma. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 109, 12922–12926 (2012).
[58] Szabo´, G., Szolnoki, A., Varga, M. & Hanusovszky, L. Ordering in spatial evolutionary games for
pairwise collective strategy updates. Phys. Rev. E 80, 026110 (2010).
[59] Lorenz, J., Rauhut, H., Schweitzer, F. & Helbing, D. How social influence can undermine the wisdom
of crowd effect. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108, 9020–9025 (2011).
[60] Huberman, B. & Glance, N. Evolutionary games and computer simulations. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
USA 90, 7716–7718 (1993).
[61] Traulsen, A., Semmann, D., Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J. & Milinski, M. Human strategy
updating in evolutionary games. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 107, 2962–2966 (2010).
[62] Szabo´, G., Vukov, J. & Szolnoki, A. Phase diagrams for an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on
two-dimensional lattices. Phys. Rev. E 72, 047107 (2005).
[63] Perc, M. Coherence resonance in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. New J. Phys. 8, 22 (2006).
[64] Vukov, J., Szabo´, G. & Szolnoki, A. Cooperation in the noisy case: Prisoner’s dilemma game on two
types of regular random graphs. Phys. Rev. E 73, 067103 (2006).
[65] Szolnoki, A., Perc, M. & Szabo´, G. Topology-independent impact of noise on cooperation in spatial
public goods games. Phys. Rev. E 80, 056109 (2009).
[66] Hauert, C. & Szabo´, G. Game theory and physics. Am. J. Phys. 73, 405–414 (2005).
[67] Szabo´, G., Szolnoki, A. & Izsa´k, R. Rock-scissors-paper game on regular small-world networks. J.
Phys. A: Math. Gen. 37, 2599–2609 (2004).
[68] Baraba´si, A.-L. & Albert, R. Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science 286, 509–512 (1999).
[69] Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Nature 364, 56–58 (1993).
[70] Macy, M. W. & Flache, A. Learning dynamics in social dilemmas. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 99,
7229–7236 (2002).
[71] Liu, Y., Chen, X., Zhang, L., Wang, L. & Perc, M. Win-Stay-Lose-Learn Promotes Cooperation in
the Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. PLoS ONE 7, e30689 (2012).
[72] Liu, Y., Chen, X., Wang, L., Li, B., Zhang, W. & Wang, H. Aspiration-based learning promotes
cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games. EPL 94, 60002 (2011).
[73] Szabo´, G. & To˝ke, C. Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice. Phys. Rev. E 58,
69–73 (1998).
[74] Fu, F., Nowak, M. A. & Hauert, C. Invasion and expansion of cooperators in lattice populations:
Prisoner’s dilemma vs. Snowdrift games. J. Theor. Biol. 266, 358–366 (2010).
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by the National 973 Program (grant 2012CB821203), the National
Natural Science Foundation of China (grants 61020106005, 10972002 and 61203374), and the
Slovenian Research Agency (grant J1-4055).
Author contributions
Xiaofeng Wang, Matjazˇ Perc, Yongkui Liu, Xiaojie Chen and Long Wang designed and performed
the research as well as wrote the paper.
Competing financial interests
The authors declare no competing financial interests.
FIG. 1: Fraction of cooperators ρC as a function of the cost-to-benefit ratio r, as obtained for K = 0.1
[panels (a) and (b)] and K = 0.83 [panels (c) and (d)]. Results presented in panels (a) and (c) were
obtained by means of Monte Carlo simulations, while those presented in panels (b) and (d) were obtained
by means of pair approximation (see Methods section for details). Figure legend indicates whether pairwise
or locally influenced strategy updating was used.
FIG. 2: Full K − r phase diagrams, as obtained by means of Monte Carlo simulations [panels (a) and (c)]
and pair approximation [panels (b) and (d)]. Upper red (lower blue) lines denote the boundaries between
the mixed C +D and homogeneous D (C) phases.
FIG. 3: Characteristic snapshots of spatial patterns formed by cooperators (blue) and defectors (red) under
pairwise imitation [(a) r = 0.004, (b) r = 0.019] and under strategy updating based on local influence
[(c) r = 0.004, (d) r = 0.221]. The size of the square lattice was 100 × 100 and K = 0.83. (a) In
this snapshot there are 77 clusters, ranging in size from a single cooperator to 3042 cooperators, with a
weighted average size of 1925.21. The stationary fraction of cooperators is ρC ≈ 0.52. (b) In this snapshot
there are 99 clusters, ranging in size from a single cooperator to 162 cooperators, with a weighted average
size of 70.01. The stationary fraction of cooperators is ρC ≈ 0.19. These characteristics are significantly
different in the bottom two snapshots. (c) In this snapshot there are 439 clusters, ranging in size from a
single cooperator to 427 cooperators, with a weighted average size of 137.69. The stationary fraction of
cooperators is ρC ≈ 0.52. (d) In this snapshot there are 164 clusters, ranging in size from a single cooperator
to 19 cooperators, with a weighted average size of 6.63. The stationary fraction of cooperators is ρC ≈ 0.05.
Note that in snapshots (a) and (c) the densities of cooperators for both update rules are practically identical,
while nearer to the extinction thresholds [panels (b) and (d)] they differ quite significantly.
FIG. 4: Macroscopic properties of cooperative clusters in the dependence on the cost-to-benefit ratio r.
Cluster size (a) and cluster count (b) are depicted for pairwise and locally influenced strategy updating. In
both cases the cluster size decreases as r increases, while the cluster count reaches a maximum at a certain
value of r and then decreases. Note that for pairwise imitation a minimum cluster size of about 76.18 is
required for cooperators to survive. Taking into account the local influence of the neighbors reduces this to
6.61. The depicted results were determined in the stationary state on 100× 100 square lattices and by using
K = 0.83. Error bars indicate the standard deviation.
FIG. 5: Schematic presentation of two representative cooperative (blue) clusters surrounded by defectors
(red). The cluster depicted left has no chances of survival under pairwise or locally influenced strategy
updating. The cluster on the right, however, cannot prevail under pairwise imitation, but can do so under
locally influenced strategy updating. This is because the core of the cooperative cluster (C1 in the figure)
is quarantined from defectors in case imitation proceeds according to local influence (see main text for
details).
